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 1.- Introduction 
                                                
 
With the creation of EMU, it seems that the exchange rate question in Europe has shifted from 
the core to the periphery and, nowadays, the emphasis has to be put on the foreign exchange 
relationships between the Ins and the Outs. The set-up of EMU meant in this respect both the 
death of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-I) and the birth of a new system. 
The so-called ERM-II is intended to provide an institutional framework for organising the 
links between the Euro and the currencies of the European Union members which do not take 
part of EMU from 1st January 1999 on. Countries involved in the EU-enlargement process are 
also concerned by the ERMII in so far as they have to define a specific exchange rate strategy 
in the perspective of their future adhesion to the monetary union. 
 
A lot remains to be known however about the precise features that such a mechanism has until 
now recovered. To focus only on European Union countries, anad even if the Danish and the 
Greek authorities have decided to let their currencies participate in the ERM-II1, the number 
and the name of other participating countries is still an open issue, notably as regards Sweden 
and the UK. Furthermore, and as reaffirmed in the Amsterdam Treaty (June 1997), the 
requirements for being eligible to enter the Euroland do not concern only the stabilisation 
relative to the Euro, the new anchor currency of the ERM-II which replaced the German 
Mark. With respect to the exchange rate criterion, the emphasis may also be put on the 
convergence of the candidate’s inflation rate to the EMU standard since direct inflation 
targeting may contribute to exchange rate pegging through the manipulation of the domestic 
interest rates2. 
 
All in all, such a vague schedule suggests a variety of alternatives regarding the behaviour of 
the currencies of the (current and next) future Ins countries. How could the latter be anchored 
to the Euro within this mechanism and what would this imply for their exchange rate paths 
before and after their entering into the ERM-II, especially if the countries concerned were 
worried about qualifying for EMU?  
More generally, in the perspective of EU enlargement, it seems important to evaluate whether 
this exchange rate mechanism can be related to a genuine management of the exchange rate or 
whether it should be considered as an empty shell (except from an institutional viewpoint). 
Indeed, the opportunity of a shadow anchoring strategy (to the ERMII) for the pre-accession 
economies would partly depend on the stabilising properties (if any) of such a mechanism 
(see Le Cacheux [1997] and Wyplosz [1996]). 
 
 
1 Short assessments are reported on the legal aspects of this adhesion and the setting-up of ERM-II by the 
European Central Bank [1998]. See also Kenen [1996] and Wyplosz [1996] for a thorough examination of the 
issues raised by EMU. 
2 It has been reluctantly agreed at the Verona meeting in April 1996 that membership in ERM-II would be 
voluntary only. This was a concession made to the British position, according to which exchange rate stability 
could be achieved only by adopting consistent inflation targets (Kenen, 1996). See also the divergent proposals 
of Persson & Tabellini [1996], Gros [1996], and Spaventa [1997].  
The answering to these questions depends on whether the new ERM may be regarded as a 
truly effective mechanism regarding exchange rate stability. It also involves considering in 
this perspective not only the policies that the monetary authorities would undertake to this 
objective but also the expectations that the market may formulate on its achievement and on 
the possibly retained parities. 
 
This study attempts to make an empirical assessment concerning the form that these 
expectations could take (and have taken) before and after the creation of EMU. Section 2 
gives an overview of the European exchange rate issue covered by this study with a special 
focus on the May 1998 decision and its likely impact on the exchange rate dynamics during 
the final months of the transition to EMU and thereafter. The institutional features of the 
ERM-II are also briefly specified. The econometric method used to extract the exchange rate 
market expectations from the observed paths of the spot rate of the concerned currencies 
against the Euro is developed in section 3. Results are discussed in section 4, and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.- From ERM-I to ERM-II: a mere reincarnation? 
                                                
 
Contrary to what had been predicted or feared3, there were neither speculative attacks 
launched against the Ins currencies during the last months of the transition phase, nor huge 
tensions on the European exchange rates, even after the final parity grid adjustment for the 
Irish currency4. The definite success of this kind of exchange rate fixing process relies heavily 
on what the market thinks about the potential parities which could be retained as the eventual 
anchors. While this issue has mattered during the final months of the transition to EMU, 
exchange rate developments in the periphery of the Euro zone are likely to be cast in the same 
framework as for the Ins. At least two reasons provide a rationale for this parallel. 
 
(1) First, an Out currency has to participate in the ERM-II to allow for the qualification of the 
issuing country for EMU. Therefore, one question concerns the parity level (vis-à-vis the 
Euro) at which the potential currency candidate would like to enter into this new structure. 
Setting the bilateral central rates to their new Euro parities5 for the former members of the 
ERM-I (the Danish Krone and the Greek Drachma) is only one part of the answer. The other 
pertains to whether the market found this choice relevant or not, which might have led it to 
revise its expectation. 
(2) Second, if a future In succeeds in qualifying for EMU, to what extent could the conversion 
rate for its currency against the Euro differ from the prevailing parity within the ERM-II? 
Given the record of the Drachma, realignments are still allowed within the new structure. One 
may ask how they might affect the behaviour of the current exchange rates (prior to and 
 
3 On the rationale of the possible speculative pressures and its links to the institutional framework adopted for 
the switch to the Euro, see De Grauwe [1998] and Obstfeld [1997]. 
4 On the economic grounds for the stabilising properties of this convergence process and of the announcement of 
the central parities, see Begg et al. [1997], and De Grauwe et al. [1999]. Alberola et al. [1999] offer a broader 
view on the exchange rate misalignments on the eve of the switch to EMU. 
5 It had been partly so as the indeterminacy of the Euro rates in terms of the In or Out currencies prevented from 
knowing the central rates in the ERM-II with certainty before the switch to EMU. Market rates in ECUs at the 
launch date of the Euro have also played a role (De Grauwe, 1998). 
following their implementation), and how the monetary authorities would accommodate or 
prevent them (through interventions6). 
 
These issues would be however of limited relevance if the ERM-II schedule were not a truly 
binding mechanism, but an empty shell. Indeed, a wide spectrum of exchange rate strategies 
would be consistent with the legal framework built at Amsterdam. In particular, the new ERM 
should provide a relevant benchmark for assessing the fulfilment of the exchange rate 
criterion to qualify for the EMU (Greece at the time being) while it does not prevent Opting 
Outs7 from being part of it. 
 
The operational features share a lot in common with those of the defunct ERM-I, except for 
the bilateral status implied by the Euro. Wide fluctuation margins, while limiting the impact 
of large competitive depreciations8, cannot be seen as a strong commitment towards exchange 
rate discipline. Some countries (like Denmark) may decide to join the system with a narrower 
than officially allowed currency band and/or to make strong monetary policy statements in 
order to convince the market of their willingness to meet the EMU standards for an imminent 
adhesion. 
 
Thus, given the range of alternatives, it is useful to assess the extent to which a genuine 
management of the exchange rate (or any constraint upon it) could have actually resulted from 
membership to this system and, thus, whether “the rules of the game” laid down at 
Amsterdam have been, until now, more notional than real. This critical analysis will not be 
restricted to the pioneering ERM-II members however. This system might have also 
influenced the path followed by other Outs currencies in so far as it could represent an 
attractive shadow anchoring mechanism9. Moreover, this allows one to test whether the 
impact of the switch to the EMU on monetary cohabitation in Europe has been contingent 
upon a new ERM. 
 
In the following we analyse these issues by evaluating whether the market has held precise 
views about potential parities of the Ins and Outs currencies from January 1997 to December 
2000. We thus have to disentangle two sub-periods during which different interdependent 
factors could have influenced market expectations. 
 
On the one hand, the revealing of the qualified countries for EMU in May 1998 could have 
acted as a trigger event since then the convergence process of the bilateral rates of the Ins 
currencies towards their announced conversion ratios might have contrasted with the Outs’ 
dynamics which could have been already governed by the expectations regarding future 
adhesion to the ERM-II. Furthermore, this coexistence could have also played a role by itself 
                                                 
6 According to the statutes of the ERM-II, the latter are automatically triggered at the margins, but may be 
stopped if they impede the pursuit of the Central Banks’ primary objectives. 
7 Like Sweden, United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Denmark which “have decided that membership in the 
Common Market does not require giving up monetary independence” (Wyplosz, 1996).  
8 Reminiscent of the huge 1992-93 crises, they aimed at removing irrelevant speculative pressures. 
9 In the following of the study, Outs countries do not include pre-accession countries (unknown at the 
time where the ERMII was created). But the shadow anchoring strategy would be a relevant one also 
for the latter – at different stages of the enlargment process. 
as the convergence process of the Ins could have affected the behaviour of the Outs, given the 
determination issue of the external value of the Euro at the date of the changeover.  
On the other hand, from January 1st 1999 on, the setting-up of the ERM-II could have exerted 
a twofold influence on the Outs exchange rates depending on their official anchoring to the 
European currency within such an arrangement.  
 
3.- Extracting market expectations from the spot 
exchange rate dynamics 
 
Our main working hypothesis is that the dynamics of the bilateral exchange rates of the 
concerned (Outs) currencies vis-à-vis the Euro can be modelled as a specific diffusion 
process. Let thus assume that the exchange rate is subject to the following stochastic 
differential equation: 
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S(t) refers to the number of domestic currency units for one Euro at date t (with starting value 
S0). W(t) is the standard Wiener process. α is the stationary value to which the spot rate is 
expected to converge in the long run. While positive, β is the mean-reversion parameter. The 
latter measures the intensity with which S(t) is attracted by α. Put differently, β is the speed of 
convergence towards the implicit (or shadow) parity α.  amounts to the instantaneous 
volatility of the spot rate.  
 
The solution for the current exchange rate can be derived from (1). For any t , we obtain 
the expression of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process: 
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Both econometric and theoretical rationales may be provided to support this analytical 
framework. 
From an economic point of view, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process assumption may provide a 
relevant and flexible theoretical basis for the exchange-rate path under a target-zone regime or 
in a managed float system (Froot & Obstfeld, 1991). In this type of model, fundamentals are 
subject to a mean-reversion drift which transmits itself to the exchange rate. Such a 
dampening force may result directly from central bank interventions at the limits and/or 
within the band. For example, Lindberg & Söderlind [1994] cast their analysis of the Swedish 
Krona’s behaviour in an extended target zone model. The mean-reversion property may be 
also an indirect consequence of the implementation of some stabilising policy based on 
instruments like interest rates to ensure the convergence of inflation and/or output to their 
desired targets. 
 
To some extent, this kind of exchange rate regime may not have been so different either from 
the operating of the ERM-I since the widening of the fluctuation margins in August 1993, or 
from the regime which the other non-participating currencies were subject to. Moreover, we 
want to investigate further on the features of the ERM-II about which little is yet known. 
Facing this problem, a cautious attitude leads us to adopt a rather flexible specification for the 
exchange rate process which could account for the singularities of each currency10.  
 
Accordingly, nothing is imposed concerning the presence and the level of the implicit parity 
value in the course of the estimation. The attraction point is undetermined whenever β is not 
significant from zero. If the mean-reverting component vanishes, the exchange rate follows a 
random walk as expected under a pure float regime with efficient markets.  
 
From an econometric point of view, we are left with the difficulty of specifying an appropriate 
structure for the exchange rate dynamics. Pitfalls encountered by numerous approaches, 
which used, or even abused, unit-root tests to detect mean-reversion, suggest evaluating the 
former through the differential equation assumed to describe the exchange rate path (Ball & 
Roma, 1992, 1994).  
In this respect, a very general specification for the exchange rate motion could have taken into 
account the peculiarities of the European target zones: reflection at both edges of the band, the 
risk of parity realignments, and conditional heteroskedasticity (induced in principle by the 
convergence process towards EMU). However, no consensus has yet emerged about the 
relevant way of incorporating the aforementioned features of the exchange rate dynamics11. 
Furthermore, substantial bias is likely to be introduced in the estimates given the absence of 
an analytical solution for such a rich, though highly questionable, specification and, as such, 
requires deriving a discrete-time expression for estimation purposes.  
 
More generally, looking at the stabilising properties of the ERM and the equilibrium parities 
perceived by market participants (in the prospect of a membership to the Euroland) seems a 
quite specific approach by focusing on the spot exchange rates dynamics only. Indeed, several 
studies concentrated on forward exchange rates (De Grauwe et al., 1997), interest rates 
                                                 
10 Moreover, it is obvious from equation (2) that the features of each Out currency rate against the Euro are 
inferred through the observation of the path followed by the corresponding bilateral rate, no matter what external 
developments could have been. But there are good reasons to consider both versions of the ERM as “hub and 
spokes” systems (according to the European Commission’s terminology), and so to focus on bilateral monetary 
links (especially for the ERM-II). 
11 Ball & Roma [1994] observe the limits from the official parity grid11, notwithstanding the institutional features 
(Honohan, 1993), and the recent findings (Chen, 1995, Labhard & Wyplosz, 1996). The endogeneity of the 
realignment probability and width (Bertola & Svensson, 1992), their time-varying nature (Pentecôte & 
Sénégas, 1997), the revaluation/devaluation asymmetry (Bertola & Caballero, 1993), and the underlying jump 
process (Perraudin, 1990) are still under debate. Finally, the growing family of ARCH-type processes illustrates 
the difficulty to find the ideal model. 
differentials (De Grauwe, 1996) or derivative products12 (Söderlind, 2000) to extract market 
expectations about future exchange rate developments. Others tried to find a “fundamental” 
equilibrium exchange rate, even if it seems fanciful given the theoretical debate and the 
unconvincing evidence (Flood & Rose, 1995). 
 
Without denying the interest of such approaches, and because the comparison of their relative 
merits goes far beyond the scope of this study, we wish rather to propose an operational 
procedure aiming, among other things, at providing a crude indicator of the bilateral 
conversion rate which would be consistent with the perceived “long-run” market equilibrium.  
 
The next step thus consists of implementing a maximum likelihood estimation directly on 
equation (2) (see appendix 1). The only requirement is regularly spaced exchange rate 
quotations over the sample period. Given closed-market days, the original daily quotes are 
interpolated to generate a “continuous” data set. Estimation of the discrete version of process 
(2) is done in an iterative way in order to account for the time-variability of the parameters. 
Two procedure are involved: the first one is the usual recursive scheme by which one quote is 
added step by step; the other is based on a sixth-month window of observations13 which 
moves over the whole sample period. The latter method dampens the memory effect of the 
former which could blur, to a significant extent, the time behaviour of the implicit parities. 
 
We focus the potential candidates for future entry into the EMU and thus for possible (if not 
already current in the period considered) ERM-II members. Among these four future Ins, two 
took part of the ERM-I (the Danish Krone, DKK, and the Greek Drachma, GRD), one left it 
(the British Pound, GBP) while the last currency has never belonged to it (the Swedish Krona, 
SEK). For comparison purposes, we consider two Ins: the Irish Pound (IEP) and the Finnish 
Markka (FIM). Two Outs are also studied, although with very different statuses: the Dollar 
(USD) plays a major role together with the Euro (EUR) in the stability of international 
monetary system; the Norwegian Krone (NOK), while not a member state of the European 
Union, may be influenced by the policies of its Scandinavian neighbours (Gerlach [1997]). 
 
Daily bilateral spot exchange rate data (from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service Retrieval 
Interface of the British Columbia University) run from January 2nd, 1997 to December 30th, 
2000. Since bilateral quotations against the Ecu were rather indicative until January 1st, 1999, 
Euro rates are obtained from the cross-product of German Mark market rates in terms of the 
considered currency with the irrevocable conversion rate of the German currency in terms of 
Euro. Thus, the exchange rate dynamics should not be altered by this change in currency 
denomination14. Although they cannot be considered as true spot rates like those observed 
since 1999, we think that this choice preserves consistency of the estimates throughout the 
whole sample and their comparability over selected sub-samples. 
                                                 
12 The latter method often assumes that the underlying spot (exchange or interest) rate follows the explosive path 
of a geometric Brownian motion. Such a behaviour is at odds with both the convergence process towards the 
EMU and the institutional design of the new ERM. 
13 The window width influences the size and significance of the mean reversion and volatility parameters, but it 
has a limited impact, if any, on the long term attraction value of the exchange rate. 
14 For example, the Danish Krone market rate against the Euro is given by (DKK/DEM)tx(DEM/EUR)* at day t. 
Thus, until the EMU, the evolution of the Euro exchange rate of a currency mimics its observed path against the 
German Mark. Since January 1999, its dynamics has to be analysed for itself. 
 4.- Monetary cohabitation on the way to EMU 
 
First of all, the estimates over the whole sample period should be compared with those 
obtained for sub-periods, especially before and after the implementation of the Euro. One may 
then ask whether official commitments to specific regimes have had any influence on private 
market expectations which may have led to distinct exchange rate dynamics. It is possible to 
know to what extent the switch to EMU, and the corresponding change in the ERM 
configuration, has modified the behaviour of spot rates, given the attitude of the countries 
concerned towards the Euroland. 
 
Next, if noticeable changes were observed in the behaviour of the bilateral current exchange 
rates under study, it may be helpful to examine whether and how the former have been taken 
into account by the market. We thus analyse how the new stance of monetary cohabitation has 
been progressively learned by private investors, given official announcements. 
 
4.1. Exchange rate regimes shifts and spot rate dynamics: was there ERM-II effect? 
 
Results from estimation of process (2) are reported for all bilateral rates against the Euro in 
table A1 (appendix 2). No close relationship appears between exchange rate dynamics and the 
regime which is officially maintained by the monetary authorities.  
 
Under the ERM-I, the stochastic process followed by the Finnish Markka resembled to those 
associated with the British Pound and the US Dollar against the Euro. The strength of the 
mean-reversion component is significant and similar for these three rates. Thus, an officious 
and discretionary leaning-against-the-wind strategy seems to produce the same effects as 
those implied by a pre-announced commitment to a specific rule. Moreover, the convergence 
speed is not significant in the Drachma case, while it is the highest for the Danish Krone, 
suggesting that multilateral exchange rate agreements may be subjected to national practices. 
 
Because the magnitude of instantaneous volatility seems to depend on the level of the 
underlying exchange rate, the first column of table A1 shows normalised volatility 
coefficients for all Euro rates and over the different sample periods ( ασ ˆˆ  in table A1). The 
currencies can be split into two groups: FIM, IEP, DKK, and GRD are characterised by a low 
level of normalised volatility, i.e. less than 6%, while GBP, NOK, SEK, and USD show 
greater variability. However, it remains unclear whether this threshold would help to 
distinguish between the various foreign exchange systems. This trigger value seems also to 
change over time, since a general decrease in normalised volatility estimates can be observed 
from table A1.  
The first line of table 2 below reports, for each currency, the percentage of deviation of the 
estimated shadow parity (Shadow1 over January 1997-December 1998, and Shadow2 over 
January 1999-December 2000) from the corresponding official level (Parity), except for the 
US Dollar for which deviations are measured on the basis of a one-to-one conversion rate. 
The identity constraint between the two former parities is tested and t-statistics are reported in 
italic below the estimates. In the case of the Drachma, the second sub-period is split according 
to the date of its ultimate parity adjustment (January 17th, 2000). 
 
Table 2: Comparisons of the estimated shadow values with the official parity
Currency Shadow1/Parity Shadow2/Parity Shadow2/Parity*
FIM 0,03% -
0,05
IEP -1,28% -
-0,62
DKK -0,45% -1,10%
-2,47 -53,34
GRD -7,90% -5,74% -2,33%
-1,69 -5,72 -2,23
USD* 12,00% -6,81%
9,33 -1,40  
N.B.: The 5% critical value for the tests is ±1,96 given the degrees of freedom at hand. 
 
The results indicate that the underlying long-run (market) equilibrium parities may differ 
noticeably from the announced official central rates, especially under very flexible regimes 
like the wide target zone for the Drachma and the apparent floating system for the Dollar 
before EMU. The behaviour of the Greek Drachma and Irish Pound share common features 
since their implicit parities have initially diverged noticeably from their central rates before 
undergoing a moderate under-valuation following their last “technical” realignment. 
 
Table 3 (below) shows the extent to which the setting of the new European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism with the Euro as anchor might have modified the main parameters describing the 
behaviour of future-Ins’ and Outs’ currencies spot rates. For each of them, the first line of 
figures reveals the relative change in every parameter estimates, while the second is the 
associated test statistic under the null of identical mean-values in the two sub-periods. 
 
Table 3: Relative change in parameters following the switch from ERM-I to ERM-II
Currency Shadow value Convergence speed Volatility
DKK -0,66% 480% -32%
-5,10 6,59 -5,85
GRD 1% 136% -20%
0,33 1,11 -2,25
GBP -9% -33% -2%
-5,37 -0,97 -0,59
SEK -6% 392% -23%
-0,80 2,07 -5,80
NOK -5% 553% -34%
-0,58 2,51 -5,97
USD -17% -65% 5%
-5,28 -2,26 1,35  
N.B.: Assuming again Normality distribution, the same critical values as above apply. 
 
The statistically significant decrease in instantaneous volatility is often associated with a 
significant positive stimulus in the convergence process, while variations in shadow parities 
reveal the weakness of the Euro against almost all other currencies. But the magnitudes of 
such variations differ considerably among the exchange rates.  
 
As a possible candidate for EMU and a member of the ERM-II, the DKK/EUR spot rate has 
seen its volatility reduced by a third and its mean-reverting force strengthened around five 
times. This is in accordance with the renewed announcement of the Danish authorities to peg 
firmly her currency to the Euro (through the official adoption of a narrow fluctuation band). 
This commitment has also been accompanied by a significant appreciation of the Danish 
Krone as suggested by the movement in the shadow long-run value reported above.  
But these movements can hardly be related to the membership of the Danish currency to the 
new ERM. As illustrated in table 3, two Out currencies, namely the Swedish and Norwegian 
Krona, exhibit the same pattern. This supports the idea that foreign exchange stabilisation 
may result either from an active (and credible) policy of exchange rate targeting (as in 
Denmark) or an equivalent strategy directly based on the inflation rate (as in Sweden). Results 
also suggest that there still remain close regional monetary relationships between the Nordic 
countries. Norwegian Krona’s dynamics strictly follows its Swedish counterpart. It is 
therefore difficult to conclude that the observed changes in the Danish currency path derive 
from the enforcement of the new ERM rather than from the protracted links to its 
Scandinavian partners. 
 
Concerning the Greek participation in the ERM-II as a prerequisite for joining the Euroland, it 
seems to have only significantly dampened the variability of the GRD/EUR spot rate (by a 
fifth compared with its previous level). Although substantial, the corresponding increase in 
the convergence speed estimate is not statistically significant. This evidence may receive two 
conflicting interpretations. It may be argued that private market participants have already 
incorporated the new monetary stance in Europe into their expectations in order to determine 
the spot market rate such that the dynamics of the former was left unchanged. Alternatively, 
one may conclude that the last European monetary reforms have had a limited impact on the 
former current rate. Further examination is thus needed. 
 
The results also confirm how hesitant the first steps of the Euro were on the international 
scene. Its behaviour against the Dollar is marked by a five percent increase in volatility (while 
not statistically significant), a (significant) lower mean-reverting force (reduced by two thirds) 
toward a (near significant 20 percent) depreciated shadow value. It looks as if the stabilisation 
of European currencies against the Euro has been at the expense of greater variability between 
the Euro and the Dollar. This could reflect the relative “benign neglect” attitude on the behalf 
of the authorities in both sides of the Atlantic Sea because of the distinct priority level 
assigned to price stability and the lack of synchronisation in their business cycles. 
 
4.2. Market learning about official statements and commitments 
 
We will now make use of the iterative estimation procedures in order to capture some of the 
features of the interaction -suggested infra- between the market participants and the monetary 
authorities in the determination of the Outs exchange rate dynamics. 
 
For this purpose, the 6-month gliding estimates of the various parameters of interest are 
presented on the figures 1 to 8 (Appendix 3). The implicit parity derived from the spot rate 
behaviour is plotted against the official central rate for each currency against the Euro in the 
upper part. The associated 95-percent confidence interval shows whether the discrepancy 
between the two reference values is significant. The estimated speed of the convergence 
implied by the OU motion is illustrated in the middle part. As stressed earlier, mean-reversion 
requires a significant and strictly positive value of β: the higher the latter, the stronger the 
attraction force on the current rate. To complete the picture, variations in the estimated 
instantaneous volatility of each spot rate, measured by its standard deviation over the sample 
window, are reported on the bottom part.  
 4.2.1. Expectations before joining a pre-announced exchange rate regime 
 
Three questions may be addressed here. Does the announced participation to a given 
exchange rate system produce the same transitional dynamics for each currency concerned? 
Does the shift to a specific regime mean a particular type of transitional dynamics of the 
current exchange rate? In both cases, does the market take the official statements into account, 
and how is it reflected in the spot rate? 
 
Adhesions to the old and the new ERM can firstly be assessed. Both the experiences of the 
Greek Drachma and the Danish Krone should be instructive since they behaved differently 
towards the monetary unification process. Greece decided to join the ERM-I on March 14th, 
1998, just a few months before adhering to the ERM-II, whereas Denmark is a long-standing 
member of the European system.  
 
During the last weeks preceding the Greek entry into the ERM-I, a dramatic acceleration 
occurred in the convergence speed (multiplied ten times) of the GRD/EUR spot rate toward a 
shadow (medium-run) value with respect to which the chosen central parity (in May 1998)15 
was clearly undervalued; meanwhile it became more volatile (figure 1). However, no similar 
shift in either parameter is apparent before its entry into the ERM-II. The underlying parity 
stays far away from its official value; it also shows much greater instability and is estimated 
with less precision in the second half of 1998. By contrast, the Danish decision to join the 
ERM-II is not preceded by any significant change in the convergence speed of the DKK/EUR 
rate, although its shadow value seems to move gradually closer toward the official target such 
that both coincide by the end of 1998 (figure 2).  
 
The former two currencies share the common feature of a big downward jump in their 
instantaneous volatility by the end of July 1998. Given the 6-month window of observations 
used for estimation, such a breakdown in the volatility path suggests that the announcement in 
May 1998 did partly remove the uncertainty about the future conversion rates at the time of 
the changeover to the single currency. Furthermore, this seems to have contributed to the 
stabilisation of the DKK/EUR rate around this central parity without requiring sustained 
official interventions to strengthen the mean-reversion effect. This may be interpreted as 
evidence of the credibility attached by the market to EU central bankers’ decision a few 
months ago. 
 
However, a similar reduction can be noticed in the estimated volatility of the two Ins 
currencies at the same time (see fig. 3 and 4 for the Irish and Finnish cases respectively). As 
with the above Outs, their variability is about half of their former level. The influence of 
official announcements on the spot rate volatility seems thus to depend more on what is 
believed by the market than on the alleged institutional changes in the exchange rate system. 
 
                                                 
15 This dynamics has also to be associated with a sharp jump in the spot exchange rate. 
Things take a different course as far as the other two parameters are concerned. The 
convergence speed tends to accelerate during the ultimate phase of transition to the EMU, 
although sooner and stronger in the Irish case than in the Finnish one. The shadow parities of 
the Ins remain remarkably stable and close to their announced conversion rates after the 
resolution taken by the European Commission. Before that, a substantial part of the 
uncertainty about the underlying equilibrium exchange rate already vanished together with a 
gradual decrease in the spot rate volatility.  
 
It is however doubtful that the official statement in May 1998 succeeded in putting an end to 
the strong linkages between Ins and Outs, whatever the regime under which they were placed 
or expected to be put. On the one side, the Irish Pound (fig. 3) and the Pound Sterling (fig. 7) 
show similar volatility trajectories, with convergence speeds of comparable magnitudes 
(although rarely significant) and shadow equilibrium values close to their corresponding 
(official or officious) central rates during the months preceding the launch of the Euro. On the 
other side, similar evidence is found among the Nordic currencies (FIM, DKK, NOK and 
SEK, see fig. 4, 2, 5, and 6 resp.). Their estimated instantaneous volatility doubled from 
September to December 1998. This shift was accompanied by a significant mean-reversion 
effect on the DKK and FIM spot rates (somewhat stronger on the latter) which seems to have 
contributed to smooth the path of the shadow parity. The Norwegian and Swedish spot rates 
show a rather different behaviour: the estimation algorithm often diverged in the absence of 
an attraction force. This result may reflect the reactions of the monetary authorities with 
respect to their own official commitments. 
 
A final parallel may be drawn between the Greek (fig. 1) and the Irish records (fig. 3) 
regarding their common experience with an ultimate realignment before joining EMU. The 
volatility of the two currencies lowered gradually more than a year before their irrevocable 
peg to the Euro, meaning also that it started to diminish before the official decision was taken. 
The most striking feature lies in the linear trend followed by the estimated shadow GRD/EUR 
parity since the mid-1999, so that it induces an almost perfect match between the final 
estimated shadow parity and the conversion rate of the Greek currency within EMU. This 
tendency is unaffected by the so-called “technical” realignment on January 17th, 2000, which 
is clearly at odds with the discontinuous path of the Irish Pound.  
 
All in all, it is hard to conclude that the spot exchange rate smooth dynamics observed before 
the introduction of the Euro has been induced by some “honeymoon effect” of official 
commitments on private market expectations. 
 
4.2.2. Expectations following new official commitments 
 
The entry of the Hellenic currency into the ERM-I is associated with a small increase in the 
variability of the parameters which seems to dampen only slowly in the early months of 1999 
(fig. 1). It looks as if the market tries to identify the strategy which was actually followed by 
the authorities at the time of their anchoring to the European system. The discrepancy 
between the market exchange rate and the implicit parity value on the one hand, and the 
official central rate within the ERM-II on the other hand (fig. 1) suggests that the game 
between these two “players” did not end as the setting-up of the new arrangement took place.  
 The stable path of the Danish Krone under the new mechanism contrasts with that undecided 
of the Drachma (fig. 2). The substantial and prolonged acceleration in the convergence speed 
confirms the official wish to engage in a closer peg to the Euro within the ERM-II than under 
the ERM-I. But such an exchange rate stabilisation is not exclusive to the EMU candidates. 
The Norwegian and Swedish currencies (fig. 5 and 6) follow their Danish neighbour (fig. 2), 
even though to a lesser extent in terms of convergence speed and instantaneous volatility. 
 
If we now consider the two last Outs currencies, the GBP and USD (fig. 8) behaviours reflect 
more a floating exchange rate than a managed one. Given the low significance of the mean 
reversion parameter, it remains to be known whether the monetary authorities did intervene 
on the foreign exchange market at all16. The official statements of the central banks suggest a 
negative answer. In addition, should the attraction points be significant, these long-term 
projections by the market would not be fundamentally opposed to the daily behaviour of the 
spot rates. However, the pattern of these implicit values is often more uneven (and scattered 
with sharp breaks) than those of the market rates, raising the possibility of no well-defined 
underlying dynamics for these currencies even over a given sub-period. 
 
Two arguments may be put forward to explain the previous and diverse empirical findings. 
First, it may be argued that the convergence process of the Ins bilateral spot rates towards the 
announced conversion ratios (from May to December 1998) has put the weight of its own 
adjustment on the peripheral currencies. To some degree, a trade-off might have prevailed 
between the stability of the former and the variability of the underlying dynamics of the Outs 
currencies. As mentioned earlier, the legal constraints on the external value of the Euro at the 
time of the switch to EMU could have had an impact on the behaviour of the Opting-Outs 
currencies (but part of the ECU basket) in order to prevent any instability on the Ins’ side. 
 
Second and more importantly, the shift in the monetary strategies that the Outs countries 
could have implemented after the May 2nd, 1998 announcement could have influenced the 
path of the related foreign exchange rates. In order to qualify for EMU, the latter could have 
decided, for a while, not to adopt an explicit exchange rate target (in the form of a strict 
anchoring towards the Euroland) so that this new deal could have been foreseen by the 
market. As it stands, the Amsterdam requirements restrain the member countries from using 
the budgetary weapon and, in this perspective, some exchange rate flexibility may be 
welcome to preserve a room of manoeuvre. The English and Swedish records suggest 
moreover that inflation targeting can make a credible alternative to an exchange rate peg as a 
monetary strategy17. In this respect, the contrasting empirical evidence obtained for the latter 
currencies on the one hand, and the Danish Krone on the other hand has certainly something 
to do with the various options in the monetary policy framework which have been pursued in 
these economies, and which are partly reflected in countries’ attitudes with respect to ERM-II 
membership18. 
                                                 
16 This is also suggested by the dubious evidence on the Swedish Krona (Gerlach, 1997). 
17 Insightful analyses of the exit out of the ERM-I strategy followed by the English monetary authorities can be 
found in Villa [1995] and Cobham [1997]. 
18 Figures 9 and 10 (not reported here) also reveal that the spot rate lies close to its corresponding moving 
shadow value as the former converges to the retained conversion rate against the Euro for four of the eight 
currencies (IEP, FIM, GRD). Instead, the current market rates of the remaining Out currencies show much 
 5.- Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
According to the empirical results from this study, the behaviour of the future Ins currencies 
can hardly be reconciled with the view that the ERM-II has been perceived by the market 
participants as an enforcing exchange rate framework (even from the 1st of January 1999 on). 
The instability of the coefficients in the underlying dynamics we have examined could signal 
their transitory nature and suggests that the market was uncertain about the future status of the 
Outs currencies during the first months after the implementation of the ERM-II. Things have 
been clarified somewhat since the mid-1999. Monetary policy design in the future Ins 
countries could partly explain these developments. Furthermore this mixed empirical evidence 
militates in favour of a regularly renewed assessment of the parameters of the dynamics 
involved. All in all, whether the ERM II proves to be more than a shadow exchange rate 
regime remains for the time being an open question. 
greater variability and diverge more often from their recursively estimated parities than the Ins or future Ins. The 
Danish Krone gives a rather ambiguous picture because there is no indication of sustained convergence to the 
central rate since its adhesion to the ERM-II. 
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Appendix 1: Maximum likelihood estimation of an 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process 
 
Consider equation (2) at two different dates, s and t, such that t hs +=  with h>0. As it 
stands, the underlying discretization scheme requires equidistant dates of observation. From 
the properties of the Wiener process, it ensues that: 
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For a given realisation S(n) of the process, Nn∈ , the corresponding innovation is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )hh ehnSenSnu ββ α −− −−−−≡ 1  (5) 
such that: 
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Thus, the log-likelihood function may be expressed as follows: 
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MV estimators of the parameters of interest are obtained through the minimization of the 
former function. Before the implementation of the optimisation algorithm, data were 
interpolated by a cubic spline with a discretisation step equal to 
365
1=h . 
 
Appendix 2: Estimation results 
 
Table A1: Results from Maximum Likelihood estimations
FX rate Sample period Param. Estimate p-val Dg. Free. Log-like.
FIM/EUR 97/01/01-98/12/31 β 5,827 0,020 739 2148
α 5,947 0,000
4,3% σ 0,258 0,000
IEP/EUR 97/01/01-98/12/31 β 1,643 0,184 739 3459
α 0,777 0,000
5,6% σ 0,044 0,000
GRD/EUR 97/01/01-00/12/31 β 1,307 0,033 1481 -2079
α 332,033 0,000
5,7% σ 18,804 0,000
97/01/01-98/12/31 β 1,247 0,243 739 -1113
α 328,783 0,000
6,3% σ 20,766 0,000
99/01/04-00/12/31 β 2,944 0,119 737 -944
α 332,823 0,000
5,0% σ 16,626 0,000
DKK/EUR 97/01/01-00/12/31 β 10,932 0,000 1481 4715
α 7,470 0,000
2,6% σ 0,196 0,000
97/01/01-98/12/31 β 12,173 0,001 739 2234
α 7,494 0,000
3,1% σ 0,231 0,000
99/01/04-00/12/31 β 70,597 0,000 737 2574
α 7,445 0,000
2,1% σ 0,157 0,000
GBP/EUR 97/01/01-00/12/31 β 1,757 0,018 1481 6562
α 0,643 0,000
8,7% σ 0,056 0,000
97/01/01-98/12/31 β 5,055 0,010 739 3277
α 0,680 0,000
8,3% σ 0,056 0,000
99/01/04-00/12/31 β 3,401 0,015 737 3282
α 0,621 0,000
8,9% σ 0,055 0,000
SEK/EUR 97/01/01-00/12/31 β 2,498 0,165 1481 2953
α 8,730 0,000
7,3% σ 0,634 0,000
97/01/01-98/12/31 β 1,305 0,639 739 1393
α 9,127 0,000
7,8% σ 0,708 0,000
99/01/04-00/12/31 β 6,424 0,002 737 1586
α 8,570 0,000
6,4% σ 0,547 0,000
NOK/EUR 97/01/01-00/12/31 β 2,586 0,180 1481 3018
α 8,250 0,000
7,4% σ 0,607 0,000
97/01/01-98/12/31 β 1,315 0,651 739 1388
α 8,581 0,000
8,3% σ 0,713 0,000
99/01/04-00/12/31 β 8,585 0,003 737 1695
α 8,170 0,000
5,8% σ 0,473 0,000
USD/EUR 97/01/01-00/12/31 β 0,901 0,154 1481 5684
α 0,975 0,000
10,3% σ 0,100 0,000
97/01/01-98/12/31 β 5,545 0,008 739 2867
α 1,120 0,000
8,7% σ 0,098 0,000
99/01/04-00/12/31 β 1,959 0,024 737 2818
α 0,932 0,000
11,0% σ 0,103 0,000
Nota Bene:
Param.  is the corresponding parameter in the regression equation (2).
Estimate represents the estimated value.
p-val. shows the marginal probability value of rejecting the nul hypothesis of no significance.
Dg. Free. represents the degrees of freedom.
Log-like. shows the maximum of the (log-)likehood function.  
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